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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MYRON BROUGH, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
vs. 
RAMON R. APPAWORA, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
Case No. 
14434 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
* * * * * * 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff, a non-Indian, claims injury from an ac-
cident occurring within the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation. 
The defendant is an enrolled member of the Ute Indian Tribe 
and challenges the jurisdiction of the lower court to render 
judgment in this case. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
A default judgment was entered on September 9, 1975, 
in the District Court of Uintah County against defendant and 
in favor of plaintiff for $28,800.00 general and special da-
mages and for $33.00 costs of Court. On or about October 22, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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1975, defendant appeared specially and moved the Court, pur-
suant to Rules 55(c) and 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, to set aside the default and default judgment and to 
dismiss the action on the basis of lack of jurisdiction over 
the defendant and the subject matter. Memoranda were submitted 
to the Court by both parties and the Court heard oral argument 
of the Motion on December 9, 1975. The defendant appeals 
herein from the Order of the Court dated December 12, 1975, 
which denied said Motion. Said Order erroneously refers to the 
Motion as having been made by the Ute Indian Tribe, not a 
party to this suit, when it was in fact made for and on behalf 
of the defendant Ramon R. Appawora. The record verifies that 
there was but one motion filed to vacate the judgment, not-
withstanding the fact that the Order of December 12, 1975, 
refers to "motions on file." 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-appellant seeks a reversal of the Order 
of the District Court denying defendant's Motion to Dismiss, 
and, thereafter, the dismissal of this action. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The accident which gave rise to this action occurred 
on November 13, 1974, on a county road right-of-way in Uintah 
County at a location 2 miles south of Fort Duchesne, Utah 
(Record pp. 22 and 30, hereafter references to the record 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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will be as follows: "R. ") . The uncontradicted evidence be-
fore the Court below is that this location, "2 miles south of 
Fort Duchesne, Utah", is located entirely within the exterior 
boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation (R. 20). The 
Uintah and Ouray Reservation is the Indian Reservation which 
is the residence of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and 
Ouray Reservation (R. 20). 
That evidence further shows that the defendant, 
Ramon R. Appawora, was and is an enrolled member of the Ute 
Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation (R. 18 and 
19), and that his residence (R. 18), and the place where 
service of process was accomplished by a Uintah County Sheriff's 
officer (R. 3), are located at Randlett, Utah, which is also 
located entirely within the exterior boundaries of the Uintah 
and Ouray Reservation (R. 20). The plaintiff is not an Indian. 
The uncontradicted evidence further shows that the 
Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation is a 
federally recognized Indian Tribe exercising the powers of 
self-government within the exterior boundaries of the Uintah 
and Ouray Reservation, and that said Tribe has a functioning 
Tribal Court which has civil jurisdiction over all cases in-
volving enrolled members of the Tribe (R. 20). 
Finally, the uncontradicted evidence before the 
trial court shows that the Ute Indian Tribe has never held an 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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election accepting Utah state jurisdiction over itself or its 
members pursuant to 25 U.S.C. Section 1321 et seq. or Section 
63-36-9 et; seq. Utah Code Annotated 1953, or otherwise granted, 
ceded or surrendered its jurisdiction to the State of Utah 
(R. 21). 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY IMPROPERLY ASSUMING 
JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT, AN ENROLLED UTE 
INDIAN, IN AN ACTION ARISING ON AN INDIAN 
RESERVATION. 
POINT I 
THE ACCIDENT GIVING RISE TO THIS ACTION OCCURRED 
IN INDIAN COUNTRY WITHIN THE UINTAH AND OURAY 
RESERVATION. 
The accident which is the subject of this action 
occurred on a county road right-of-way within the exterior 
boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation. The 
law is well settled that a road right-of-way is part of the 
Indian reservation for purposes of determining the applicable 
jurisdiction to hear a case involving an Indian. 
Under federal law "Indian Country" is defined as 
follows: 
....[Tlhe term "Indian country", as used in this 
chapter, means (a) all land within the limits 
of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction 
of the United States Government, notwithstanding 
the issuance of any patent, and, including 
rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) 
all dependent Indian communites within the borders 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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of the United States whether within the original or 
subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether 
within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all 
Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have 
not been extinguished, including rights-of-way 
running through the same, (18 U.S.C. Section 1151) 
In a footnote in its recent decision in the case of 
DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 43 L. Ed. 2d 
300, 304, fn 2, 95 S. Ct. (1975), the U.S. Supreme Court 
noted as follows: 
If the lands in question are within a continuing 
"reservation," jurisdiction is in the tribe and 
the Federal Government "notwithstanding the issuance 
of any patent, [such jurisdiction] including rights-
of-way running through the reservation." 18 U.S.C. 
Section 1151(a) ***. While Section 1151 is concerned, 
on its face, only with criminal jurisdiction, the 
Court has recognized that it generally applies as 
well to questions of civil jurisdiction. [Citations] 
The North Dakota Supreme Court, reversing an earlier 
• opinion which held that the state courts had jurisdiction over 
a civil case involving an automobile accident occurring on a 
state highway within an Indian Reservation, has stated as 
follows: 
There can be no doubt that state highways within 
the boundaries of a reservation are part of the 
reservation. "Indian Country" is defined by 
Federal law as being all land within the limits 
of an Indian reservation under jurisdiction of 
the United States Government, "including rights-
of-way running through the reservation,..." 
18 U.S.C.A. Section 1151. Gourneau v. Smith, 
207 N.W. 2d 256 at 258 (N. Dak. 1973). 
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See also Schantz v. White Lightning, 231 N.W. 2d 812 (N. Dak. 
1975) . 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently like-
wise held: 
[W]e note that the fact that the events of interest 
here may have occurred within the right-of-way for 
a state highway avails the defendant nothing. Rights-
of-way running through a reservation remain part of 
the reservation and within the territorial juris-
diction of the tribal police. 
Ortiz-Barraza v. U.S., 512 F. 2d 1176, 1180 (9th 
Cir. 1975) . 
The decision in Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 
351, 7 L. Ed. 2d 346, 82 S. Ct. 424 (1962), specifically held 
that fee patented land located within a township within an 
Indian reservation had not lost its status as part of the Indian 
reservation. This decision is based, in part, upon relevant 
language in 18 U.S.C. Section 1151 (cited, supra) which states 
that not only rights-of-way, but fee patented lands as well, 
within an Indian Reservation, retain their status as "Indian 
country" and remain part of the reservation. 
This position has been followed in the supreme courts 
of the states as well. See, £.cj. , Kain v. Wilson, 161 N.W. 2d 
704 (S. Dak., 1968), which held that state courts had no juris-
diction to hear and determine a civil action by a non-Indian 
against a tribal Indian for alleged wrongful use and possession 
of land located in "Indian country," even though a patent had 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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issued to the land in question and title thereto was vested in 
the non-Indian plaintiff. 
This court recognized that a state highway running 
through an Indian reservation is a part of the reservation in 
the case of State v. Roedl, 107 Utah 538, 155 P. 2d 741, 743 
(1945). The case involved U.S. Highway 40 running through the 
Uintah and Ouray Reservation referred to as the "Uintah Indian 
Reservation" by the court. 
Based on the established facts in the record and 
applicable law, there is no question but that the incident in 
question herein involves a Ute Indian defendant in a cause of 
action arising on and within the Ute Indian Reservation. 
POINT II 
FEDERAL AUTHORITY AND TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY PREEMPT 
EXERCISE OF STATE JURISDICTION. 
The appropriateness of looking to federal law in any 
case involving an Indian on his reservation, stems from the ex-
press reservation of authority by the U.S. Constitution, to 
the Congress "To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and 
among the several states, and with the Indian tribes." 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, U.S. Constitution. See e.£., 
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219, fn 4, 3 L. Ed. 2d 251, 
79 S. Ct. 269 (1959) and McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission, 
411 U.S. 164, 172, fn 7, 36 L. Ed. 2d 129, 93 S. Ct. 1257 (1973). 
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The U.S. Supreme Court has held on numerous occasions 
that: 
It is thoroughly established that Congress has 
plenary authority over the Indians and all their 
tribal relations, and full power to legislate 
concerning their tribal property. The guardian-
ship arises from their condition of tutelage or 
dependency; and it rests with Congress to deter-
mine when the relationship shall cease; the mere 
grant of rights of citizenship not being sufficient 
to terminate it. Winton v. Amos, 255 U.S. 373, 
391-2, 65 L. Ed. 684, 41 S. Ct. 342 (1921). 
It is equally well established that: 
When Congress has once established a reservation, 
all tracts included within it remain a part of the 
reservation until separated therefrom by Congress. 
United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 285, 54 
L. Ed. 195, 30 S. Ct. 93 (1909). 
See also Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 7 L. Ed. 2d 
346, 82 S. Ct. 424 (1962), Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 37 
L. Ed. 2d 92, 93 S. Ct. 2245 (1973), and DeCoteau v. District 
County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 43 L. Ed. 2d 300, 95 S. Ct. 
(1975), reaffirming this point. 
The classic case denying state courts jurisdiction 
over reservation Indians for civil cause of action arising in 
the Indian's reservation, is Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 3 
L. Ed. 2d 251, 79 S. Ct. 269 (1959). In this case, the U.S. 
Supreme Court reversed a decision of the Supreme Court of 
Arizona which had held that Arizona courts had jurisdiction of 
a civil suit against reservation Indians for goods sold to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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them by a non-Indian operating a store on the reservation. 
There can be no doubt that to allow the exercise 
of state jurisdiction here would undermine the 
authority of the tribal courts over reservation 
affairs and hence would infringe on the right of 
the Indians to govern themselves. It is immaterial 
that respondent is not an Indian. He was on the 
Reservation and the transaction with an Indian took 
place there. *** The cases of this court have con-
sistently guarded the authority of Indian govern-
ments over their reservations. 358 U.S. at 223. 
The doctrine of Williams v. Lee in a situation such 
as this case presents has been strengthened since it was pro-
nounced in 1959. The Supreme Court has consistently held that 
the sole means by which a state can acquire civil jurisdiction 
over reservation Indians for cause of action arising on the 
reservation is by following the requirements of 25 U.S.C. 
Section 1321 et: seq. As stated in McClanahan v. Arizona Tax 
Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 180, 36 L. Ed. 2d 129, 93 S. Ct. 
1257 (1973): 
Appellee cites us to no cases holding that this 
legislation may be ignored simply because tribal 
self government has not been infringed. On the 
contrary, this court expressly rejected such a 
position only two years ago. [Kennerly v. District 
Court, 440 U.S. 423 (1971), see infra.] 
The footnote following this statement states: 
Indeed, the position was expressly rejected in 
Williams, itself, upon which appellee so heavily 
relies. Williams held that "absent governing 
Acts of Congress, the question has always been 
whether the state action infringed on the right 
of reservation Indians to make their own laws 
and be ruled by them. [Citation] Id., footnote 
21, [Emphasis the Court's.] 
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Clearly then, the right enunciated in Williams v. Lee 
is a right which must be viewed from the perspective of the in-
dividual Indian himself, rather than from the tribal point of 
view. The right is that of the individual Indian to have the 
tribal court of his reservation hear and decide cases against 
the Indian arising on the reservation. The Navajo Tribe, as 
a Tribe, had no more interest in the debt which was the subject 
matter of Williams v. Lee, than does the Ute Tribe in the auto 
accident which is the precipitating event herein. The Supreme 
Court in Williams v. Lee denied jurisdiction to the Arizona 
state courts because they did not have jurisdiction, whether a 
distinct tribal interest in the transaction was involved or 
not. 
k The plenary power of Congress exercised in its trustee 
relationship to American Indians has so pervaded the field of 
Indian affairs so as to completely preempt the state from en-
croachment into reservation matters, except upon such condition 
as the Congress itself may dictate. See 25 U.S.C. Section 1321 
et seq. discussed below. 
The federal government, on the other hand, has con-
tinued to recognize tribal sovereignty and the right of Indians 
to govern themselves. See e.£. , Indian Self-Determination Act, 
25 U.S.C. Section 450 et seq. As this court has observed in 
Allen v. Merrell, 6 Utah 2d 32, 305 P. 2d 490, 493 (1956): 
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The Indian tribes have not entirely lost their 
character as sovereign entities, but retain a sub-
stantial degree of autonomy under which they may 
and do operate independent of state government. 
They have the power to adopt a constitution, enact 
tribal laws to which members of the tribe are subject, 
to prevent the sale or alienation of tribal lands, 
and to negotiate with federal, state and local 
governments. They also have the power to tax, to 
employ counsel and to prosecute actions for the tribe. 
As recent as March 6, 1956, the U.S. Court of Appeal 
for the Eighth Circuit in the case of Iron Crow v. 
Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation stated, 
"We hold that the Indian tribes, such as the defendant 
Oglala Sioux of the Pine Ridge Reservation, South 
Dakota, still possess their inherent sovereignty 
excepting only where it has been specifically taken 
from them, either by treaty or by Congressional Act. 
[231 F. 2d 89, 94 (8th Cir. 1956)] 
The Utah Supreme Court has also noted: 
[lit is the uniform holding of the courts that, so 
long as Indians maintain their tribal relations, 
the courts will recognize the tribal customs pre-
vailing and administered by such tribes. 
*** 
They [the Indians] were and always have been, re-
garded as having a semi-independent position when 
they preserved their tribal relations; not as states, 
not as nations, not as possessed of the full 
attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people, 
with the power of regulating their internal and 
social relations, and thus far not brought under 
the laws of the Union or of the state within whose 
limits they reside. (U.S. v. Kagima, 118 U.S. 375). 
In re: Wo-Gin-Up's Estate, 57 Utah 29, 192 Pac. 
267, 270-1, (1920). [Emphasis added.] 
POINT III 
UTAH STATUTES PROHIBIT EXERCISE OF STATE JURIS-
DICTION WITHOUT FORMAL TRIBAL CONSENT 
The Congress of the United States has authorized the 
states to assume jurisdiction over Indian country provided both 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-12-
the state and the tribe consent to such jurisdiction: 
The consent of the United States is hereby given 
to any State not having jurisdiction over civil 
causes of action between Indians or to which Indians 
are parties which arise in the areas of Indian country 
situated within such State to assume, with the consent 
of the tribe occupying the particular Indian country 
or part thereof which would be affected by such 
assumptionf such measure of jurisdiction over any 
or all such civil causes of action arising within 
such Indian country or any part thereof as may be 
determined by such State to the same extent that such 
State has jurisdiction over other civil causes of 
action, and those civil laws of such State that are 
of general application to private persons or private 
property shall have the same force and effect within 
such Indian country or part thereof as they have 
elsewhere within that State. 25 U.S.C. Section 1322(a). 
In response to this 1968 federal law, the Utah State 
Legislature in 1971 enacted Sections 63-36-9 through 63-36-17, 
U.C.A. 1953 (1975 Pocket Supplement). Specifically, Section 
63-36-9 U.S.A. provides: 
The state of Utah hereby obligates and binds 
itself to assume criminal and civil jurisdiction 
over Indians and Indian territory, country and 
lands or any portion thereof within this state 
in accordance with the consent of the United 
States given by the act of April 11, 1968, 82 
Stat. 78-80 (Public Law 284, 90th Congress), 
to the extent authorized by the act and this 
act. 
The term "Indian Country" is used in both the federal and state 
statutes (compare to cases applying 18 U.S.C. Section 1151 as 
noted above). 
Section 63-36-13 deals with the subject of "Civil 
jurisdiction" and states as follows: 
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The state of Utah shall assume jurisdiction over 
civil causes of action as set forth in this act, 
between Indians or to which Indians are parties 
in the lands described in each tribal resolution 
sixty days after issuance of the governor's pro-
clamation to the same extent it has jurisdiction 
over civil causes of action as elsewhere within 
the state. The civil laws of the state shall 
have the same force and effect within such lands 
as they have elsewhere within the state, except as 
otherwise provided by this act. 
The Utah act and the federal act establish necessary 
conditions precedent before the assumption of jurisdiction will 
be effective. Both 25 U.S.C. Section 1326 and Section 63-36-10 
U.C.A. 1953 require that a tribal consent election be held be-
fore state jurisdiction may be applied to the reservation and 
its Indian residents. 25 U.S.C. Section 1326 makes the 
following requirement: 
State jurisdiction acquired pursuant to this 
subchapter with respect to criminal offenses or 
civil causes of action, or with respect to both, 
shall be applicable in Indian country only where 
the enrolled Indians within the affected area 
of such Indian country accept such jurisdiction 
by a majority vote of the adult Indians voting at 
a special election held for that purpose. The 
Secretary of the Interior shall call such special 
election under such rules and regulations as 
he may prescribe, when requested to do so by the 
tribal council or other governing body, or by 
20 percentum of such enrolled adults. 
Section 63-36-10, in conformity with the federal statute, pro-
vides as follows: 
State jurisdiction acquired or retroceded pur-
suant to this act with respect to criminal offenses 
or civil causes of action shall be applicable in 
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Indian country only where the enrolled Indians 
residing within the affected area of such Indian 
country accept state jurisdiction or request its 
retrocession by a majority vote of the adult 
Indians voting at a special election held for that 
purpose. All special elections shall be called 
pursuant to federal law. 
Section 63-36-11 imposes the additional requirement that the 
Governor of the State formally accept the "cession of juris-
diction" and thereafter issue a proclamation defining the 
extent of the assumption by the State. 
As indicated in the Statement of Facts, the uncon-
tradicted evidence before the District Court was: 
That the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray 
Reservation, has never accepted Utah State Juris-
diction over itself or its members pursuant to 
25 U.S.C. Section 1321 et seg. or Section 63-36-9 
et seg. U.C.A. 1953, or otherwise granted, ceded 
or surrendered its jurisdiction to the State of 
Utah. (R. 21) 
Absent such acceptance of jurisdiction, the district court 
could neither assume nor exercise jurisdiction over defendant, 
an enrolled reservation Indian, for a cause of action arising 
on his reservation. 
The absolute mandatory nature of the requirement of 
a tribal election as a precondition to state assumption of 
jurisdiction over Indians on their reservation is stated ex-
plicitly in the case of Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 
440 U.S. 423, 27 L. Ed. 2d 507, 91 S. Ct. 480 (1971). This 
case arose when suit was commenced in a Montana state court 
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against members of the Blackfeet Tribe to recover a debt arising 
from the purchase of groceries in a store in Browning, Montana, 
a town incorporated under Montana law, but located within the 
exterior boundaries of the Blackfeet Reservation. In 1967, the 
Blackfeet Tribal Council had passed a resolution apparently 
giving the Montana state courts concurrent jurisdiction over 
suits against members of the Tribe. The Montana trial and 
supreme courts upheld jurisdiction over the Indians. 
The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the judgment solely 
because the procedures specified in 25 U.S.C. Section 1326 had 
not been followed, in that no tribal consent election was ever 
held. Absent such election, the court heldf the State of 
Montana could not assume or exercise its court jurisdiction over 
the defendant reservation Indians, despite the consent of the 
I 
Tribal Council. In the present case, not only is a tribal 
consent election absent, but there has never been any attempt 
by the Ute Tribal Business Committee to cede or grant jurisdic-
tion to the State of Utah. 
The North Dakota Supreme Court has considered this 
issue several times in recent years and each time held against 
state court jurisdiction. In Gourneau v. Smith, 207 N.W. 2d 
256 (N. Dak. 1973), the North Dakota Supreme Court held not 
only that the state highways within the boundaries of an 
Indian reservation were in fact part of the reservation for 
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jurisdictional purposes, but that, absent compliance with 
25 U.S.C. Section 1321, el: seq. , the state courts could not 
exercise jurisdiction over claims arising out of an automobile 
accident involving an Indian defendant which occurred within 
the exterior boundaries of an Indian reservation. 
Likewise in Schantz v. White Lightning, 231 N.W. 2d 
812 (N. Dak. 1975), the North Dakota Supreme Court considered 
facts on "all fours" with the present case: 
whether or not the North Dakota courts have juris-
diction of an action brought by a non-Indian against 
an enrolled Indian residing on an Indian reservation 
for injuries resulting from a motor vehicle accident 
which took place on a state highway within the 
limits of the Indian reservation on which the en-
rolled Indian resided. 231 N.W. 2d at 814. 
As in its other cases, the North Dakota Supreme Court ruled 
against state court jurisdiction, noting as follows after 
citing to the Williams and McClanahan cases: 
[A]ny change from the present case law would require 
action by the United States Congress. The appellants 
are asking this court to assume the duties and re-
sponsibilities which are vested solely in the United 
States Congress. The arguments presented should 
be addressed to that body. 231 N.W. 2d at 815-6. 
Plaintiff in this case had previously attempted to obtain a 
remedy in both the state and federal courts. See Schantz v. 
White Lightning, 386 F. Supp. 1070 (D.C.N.D. 1973), afffd, 502 
F. 2d 67 (8th Cir. 1974). 
The Montana Supreme Court in Blackwolf y. District Court, 
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493 P. 2d 1293 (Mont. 1972), ordered the dismissal of a case in 
state juvenile court against enrolled Indians for acts of de-
linquency allegedly committed within the exterior boundaries of 
their reservation, even though the tribal juvenile court had 
"remanded" the case to the state juvenile court. The court 
noted that the procedural prerequisites of 25 U.S.C. Section 
1321 et. seq. had not been followed by either the state or the 
tribe, and stated as a preliminary premise to its decision as 
follows: 
At this point we emphasize that all matters con-
cerning the exercise of jurisdiction by state courts 
over enrolled Indian citizens who reside within the 
exterior boundaries of an Indian reservation are 
controlled solely by federal law, as to acts or 
transactions within the exterior boundaries of the 
reservation. 493 P. 2d at 1294 Emphasis the court's. 
In the case of Wauneka v. Campbell, 526 P. 2d 1085 
(Ariz. Ct. of App. 1974), the court held that Arizona cannot 
enforce its motor vehicle laws or its safety responsibility act 
against Navajo Indians on their reservation, absent compliance 
with 25 U.S.C. Section 1321, ejb seq. , despite the fact that 
the Navajo Tribe had incorporated certain parts of the Arizona 
Motor Vehicle laws as the law of the Tribe. 
In Poitra v. Demarrias, 502 F. 2d 23 (8th Cir. 1974), 
the Circuit Court reversed the refusal to assume jurisdiction 
by the federal district court in an action between reservation 
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Indians for wrongful death arising out of an automobile accident 
occurring on an Indian reservation, noting that, because of 
the State of North Dakota's failure to fulfill the requirements 
of 25 U.S.C. Section 1321 et seq., the courts of the State of 
North Dakota would not have had jurisdiction. 
The North Dakota Supreme Court even went to the extreme 
of denying jurisdiction in a case involving the voluntary consent 
of the Indian defendant to the jurisdiction of the state court 
in Nelson v. Dubois, 232 N.W. 2d 54 (N. Dak. 1975). In that 
case, non-Indian plaintiffs sued an enrolled Indian defendant 
for a claim arising out of an automobile accident occurring 
on a state highway within the exterior boundaries of the Fort 
Totten Indian Reservation. The defendant Indian had signed a 
form giving her consent to state jurisdiction pursuant to a 
state statute which provides that such consent may be obtained 
from individual Indians. The relevant tribal court could only 
exercise jurisdiction for cases under $300.00 in amount. The 
North Dakota Supreme Court held that, absent compliance with 
25 U.S.C. Section 1326 by tribal consent election, the state 
courts could not exercise jurisdiction over the defendant Indian 
even though no other judicial forum existed in which the plaintiffs 
could get relief. The court noted the language from the McClana-
han decision quoted above and concluded as follows in response to 
the contention that the test of Williams v. Lee should be applied 
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only when there is a demonstrable interference with tribal 
sovereignty, rather than mere failure to comply with 25 U.S.C. 
Section 1326: 
Thus, it may be seen that the Williams test of 
"infringement" or "interference" has for all 
practical purposes, been abandoned. Public Law 
90-284 applies to the assumption of jurisdiction 
by any state over any Indian reservation and as 
to any subject matter. It is difficult to envision 
a clearer statement of federal preemption. Thus, 
we are unable to read beyond the opening phrase 
of the Williams test in an effort to find "residuary" 
state jurisdiction. 232 N.W. 2d at 58. 
Finally, a recent article in the Utah Law Review, 
"Civil Jurisdiction and the Indian Reservation," 1973 Utah Law 
Review, Summer, p. 206 at 221, notes as follows: 
The rule of Williams v. Lee — limiting juris-
diction in reservation-based contract cases be-
tween Indians and non-Indians exclusively to tribal 
courts — has been extended to reservation based 
torts. Thus, if an automobile accident between 
an Indian and a non-Indian were to occur on a reser-
vation, the state court would be precluded from 
exercising jurisdiction if the non-Indian were to 
sue first. Since the state court lacks subject 
matter jurisdiction, it would make no difference 
if the Indian defendant were to be served with 
process off the reservation. 
POINT IV 
STATE OFFICERS CANNOT VALIDLY SERVE STATE PROCESS 
ON AN INDIAN ON HIS RESERVATION. 
The Colorado Supreme Court in Martin v. Denver Juve-
nile Court, 493 P. 2d 1093 (Colo. 1972), held that a summons 
served on an enrolled member of an Indian tribe by a deputy 
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sheriff, on the Indian reservation where the Indian resided, 
did not give the state juvenile court jurisdiction over the 
Indian in a paternity action, even though conception was 
alleged to have occurred off of the reservation. 
In Annis v. Dewey County Bankf 355 F. Supp. 133 
(D.S.Dak. 1971), the federal court enjoined enforcement of a 
state court judgment against an enrolled reservation Indian. 
The court noted that the procedural prerequisites of 25 U.S.C. 
Section 1321, ei: seq. , had not been complied with and denied 
jurisdiction even though the security agreement in question 
was signed off of the reservation, its breach occurred off of 
the reservation, and the Indian was served with state process 
off of the reservation. The court stated that 
This argument fails to recognize that the actual 
attachment by state officials must be made on the 
reservation and state officials have no jurisdiction 
on Indian reservations either to serve process on an 
enrolled Indian or to enforce a state judgment. 
355 F. Supp. at 135-6. 
POINT V 
ADEQUATE REMEDIES ARE AVAILABLE TO PLAINTIFF IN 
TRIBAL COURTS 
As shown by the evidence presented to the District 
Court below (see R. 20), the Ute Indian Tribe has a functioning 
Tribal Court which exercises civil jurisdiction over all cases 
involving enrolled members of the Tribe. Plaintiff has avail-
able to him an adequate remedy in the Ute Indian Tribal Court; 
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he will not be left remediless by the dismissal of this action. 
The U.S. Supreme Court, in the recent case of United 
States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 42 L. Ed. 2d 706, 717, 95 S. 
Ct. (1975), restated the holding of Williams v. Lee which 
confirmed the propriety of requiring non-Indians to pursue their 
remedies in tribal courts for claims against Indians arising 
on Indian reservations. 
In holding that the authority of tribal courts 
could extend over non-Indians, insofar as con-
cerned their transactions on a reservation with 
Indians, we stated: "It is immaterial that re-
spondent is not an Indian. He was on the Reser-
vation and the transaction with an Indian took 
place there. [Citations omitted.] The cases 
of this Court have consistently guarded the au-
thority of Indian governments over their reser-
vations. ***" 
CONCLUSION 
This case is of extreme importance to every Indian 
in the State of Utah, as well as to the defendant. It poses the 
crucial question of what circumstances may justify a state 
court in interposing itself into Indian reservation matters. 
In this case the State District Court asserted that 
it had authority to enter a default judgment against an Indian 
who had been served by a state officer in Indian country, in 
an action arising from an automobile accident occurring with-
in an Indian reservation, all of which is contrary to federal 
law and the express provisions of Section 63-36-9 ejb se£. U.C.A. 
1953 (1975 Pocket Part). 
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Both subject matter and personal jurisdiction being 
absent herein, this Court should reverse the Order of the 
District Court and order the dismissal of this action. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this SLQ^day of February, 
1976. 
.BOYDEN, KENNEDY, ROMNEY & HOWARD 
Scott C. Pugsle 
Attorney for Defendant 
Appellant 
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